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Abstract 
The philosophical premises of the second King Report on 
corporate governance 
This article focuses on the philosophical presuppositions of the 
second King Report on corporate governance for South Africa 
(hereafter referred to as the King II Report). Especially in the 
“Introduction and Background” section of the King II Report it is 
clear that the Report is premised upon a specific  understanding 
of the present-day corporation and its moral obligations. The 
purpose of this article is to commit what Charles Taylor called 
“an act of retrieval” in which the philosophical premises of the 
King II Report will be unearthed and exposed. It will be argued 
that the view of the present-day corporation that underlies the 
King II Report could be related back to a number of debates on 
the notion of the comtemporary corporation and its moral 
responsibilities that have been played out since the 1970s. It 
will be indicated how these debates provide the philosophical 
foundations for  the view of the comtemporary corporation and 
its moral obligations that is espoused in the King II Report. The 
claim made in the Report that the African world view and culture 
influenced the Report’s notion of corporate governance will also 
be critically reviewed. Finally it will be attempted to evaluate to 
what extent the recommendations of the King II Report live up 
to its own philosophical premises. 
Opsomming 
Die filosofiese voorveronderstellings van die tweede King-
verslag oor korporatiewe beheer 
Die fokus van hierdie artikel is die filosofiese voor-
veronderstellings van die tweede King-verslag oor korporatiewe 
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beheer vir Suid-Afrika (voorts word na hierdie verslag verwys as 
die King II-verslag). Veral in die afdeling van die King II-rapport, 
getitel “Inleiding en agtergrond”, is dit duidelik dat dié verslag se 
voorveronderstellings berus op ’n spesifieke siening van 
hedendaagse korporasies en hulle morele verpligtings. Die doel 
van die artikel is om in die woorde van Charles Taylor ’n “act of 
retrieval” uit te voer waardeur die filosofiese voorveronder-
stellings van die King II-verslag opgediep en blootgelê word. Dit 
word beredeneer dat die onderliggende beskouing van heden-
daagse korporasies in die King II-verslag terugherlei kan word 
na ’n aantal debatte oor die idee van hedendaagse korporasies 
en hulle morele verantwoordelikhede wat sedert die sewentiger-
jare na vore gekom het. Dit sal aangetoon word op watter wyse 
hierdie debatte die filosofiese grondslae bied vir die siening van 
hedendaagse korporasies en hulle morele verpligtings soos dit 
in die King II-verslag saam verbind word. Die aanspraak in die 
Verslag dat die Afrika-wêreldbeskouing en -kultuur die Verslag 
se opvatting van korporatiewe beheer beïnvloed het, word ook 
krities ondersoek. In die laaste instansie sal gepoog word om te 
evalueer tot watter mate die aanbevelings van die King II- 
verslag sy eie filosofiese voorveronderstellings gestand doen. 
1. Introduction 
When the second King Report on corporate governance for South 
Africa was published in 2002 it was hailed as “a world first” with 
regard to its inclusive approach to corporate governance. Like its 
predecessor, the King Report on corporate governance for South 
Africa of 1994, it has been widely acknowledged as one of the most 
progressive corporate governance reports around the world. 
This article focuses on the philosophical underpinnings of the 
second King Report on corporate governance for South Africa 
(hereafter referred to as the King II Report). Especially in the 
“Introduction and Background” section of the King II Report (IoD, 
2002:5-19) it is clear that the Report is premised upon a specific 
understanding of the present-day corporation and its moral 
obligations. The purpose of this article is to commit what Charles 
Taylor called “an act of retrieval” (Taylor, 1991:23) in which the 
philosophical premises of the King II Report will be unearthed and 
exposed. It will be argued that the view of the modern corporation 
that underpins the King II Report could be related to a number of 
debates on the contemporary corporation and its moral 
responsibilities – debates that started in the 1970s and continued 
over the ensuing three decades. It will be indicated how these 
debates provide the philosophical foundations for the view of the 
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contemporary corporation and its moral obligations that is espoused 
in the King II Report. The Report also claims that its notion of 
corporate governance has been influenced by “the African world 
view and culture” (IoD, 2002:17). This claim will also be critically 
investigated. Finally the question will be posed whether the 
philosophical premises of the King II Report and the re-
commendations of the Report are congruent. Before the above will 
be done, a brief exposition of the King II view of the present-day 
concept of the corporation and its moral obligations will be provided. 
2. The King II view of the corporation 
In the “Introduction and Background” section of the King II Report 
the authors of the Report deliberately tried to provide an 
understanding of the contemporary notion of the corporation (or “the 
company” as they sometimes referred to it). This understanding of 
the contemporary corporation and its obligations provide the 
intellectual background against which the recommendations of the 
Report are presented. This view of the corporation can be 
summarised as follows: 
Present-day corporations are driven by entrepreneurship and 
enterprise. When they are run efficiently they are an asset to their 
shareholders, stakeholders and the economies within which they 
operate. Present-day corporations often yield considerable influence 
in the societies within which they operate and they should take 
responsibility for their impact upon society.  
The ‘company’ remains a key component of modern society. In 
fact, in many respects companies have become a more 
immediate presence to many citizens and modern democracies 
than either governments or other organs of civil society (IoD, 
2002:8).  
This view implies that corporations can not merely focus on matters 
of economic efficiency, but need to strike a balance between 
economic efficiency and societal impact. This balance between 
corporate objectives and the well-being of society is a recurring 
theme in the Report. It therefore does not surprise that the Report 
starts with a quotation from Sir Adrian Cadbury that emphasises the 
need for balance. 
Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance 
between economic and social goals, and between individual 
and communal goals … the aim is to align as nearly as possible 
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the interests of individuals, corporations and society (IoD, 
2002:5). 
The present-day corporation enjoys ontological status both as a 
legal and as a moral person. As a legal person the corporation is not 
owned (or the slave) of any specific group. Shareholders are thus 
not regarded as the owners of the corporation, but as a stakeholder 
group (albeit a very significant one) who along with other 
stakeholder groups holds an interest in the organisation. The board 
of directors consequently is accountable to the corporation as a 
legal person and not to any specific stakeholder group. 
The logic has been that shareowners are entitled to expect 
directors to run the company in their sole interest – the so-
called shareowner dominant theory. This has been rejected by 
Courts in various jurisdictions, because on incorporation the 
company becomes a separate persona in law and no person, 
whether natural or juristic can be owned. … Consequently 
directors … must act in the interest of the company as a 
separate person (IoD, 2002:9). 
The board of directors as the stewards of the corporation is 
responsible to all stakeholders of the corporations. This view implies 
that the corporation is, besides a legal person, also a moral person 
(or agent). This assumption is clearly reflected in the fact that the 
Report on various occasions refers to the present-day corporation 
as a “corporate citizen”. As such the corporation has specific social 
responsibilities towards the stakeholders and communities who are 
affected by its operations. The stakeholders’ interests need to be 
respected and taken into consideration by the corporation. This view 
of the corporation finds expression in the integrative or inclusive 
approach to corporate governance that the Report adopts and 
advocates. 
The inclusive approach requires that the purpose of the 
company be defined, and the values by which the company will 
carry on its daily life should be identified and communicated to 
all stakeholders. The stakeholders relevant to the company’s 
business should also be identified. These three factors must be 
combined in developing the strategies to achieve the company’s 
goals. The relationship between the company and its 
stakeholders should be mutually beneficial (IoD, 2002:6). 
Underneath this view of the modern corporation and its moral 
obligations lurk a number of philosophical premises that have been 
fiercely contested in the field of Business Ethics since the 1970s. 
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Especially the debates on corporate social responsibility, on the 
moral agency of corporations, and on stakeholder theory seem to 
have had a significant impact on the King II view of the present-day 
corporation. None of these debates are mentioned in the Report, nor 
are references to them to be found in the bibliography of the Report. 
These debates and their bearing upon the King II notion of the 
contemporary corporation will now be investigated as well as the 
Report’s claim that its view of corporate governance has been 
influenced by the African worldview and culture. 
3. Corporate social responsibility 
A landmark position in the debate on corporate social responsibility 
was taken by Milton Friedman in his article, titled “The social 
responsibility of business is to increase its profits”, originally 
published in 1970. In this article he rejects the tendency by 
corporations to engage in acts of corporate social responsibility and 
accuses those advocating it of “preaching pure and unadulterated 
socialism”, and also of being “unwitting puppets of the intellectual 
forces that have been undermining the basis of a free society” (cf. 
Friedman, 1993:162). 
His concern about corporate social responsibility is twofold. Firstly 
he asserts that it was not the responsibility of business to attend to 
social issues in society. Business has an altogether different 
purpose, which is to make profit. When a business is profitable, 
benefits would accrue to all associated with the business – thus 
typical neo-classical trickle-down economics. Should a business 
sense that it can increase its profits by supporting some social 
cause such as education or community development, it would be 
wise to do so. But then it is not a case of corporate social 
responsibility, Friedman argues. It is merely a case of a business 
that is sufficiently farsighted to act in its own interest. The purpose of 
the exercise is not to practise social responsibility, but to increase 
the profits of the business. 
His second concern is about the ability of business executives to 
make sound decisions on social responsibility. He believes that 
managers neither have the mandate (as argued above) nor the 
competence to make sound decisions on social responsibility. 
According to Friedman the spending of corporate funds on social 
responsibility amounts to imposing taxes on the stockholders or any 
other stakeholder of the business who might have benefited from the 
money spent on corporate social responsibility. The imposition and 
allocation of tax are governmental functions that managers are not 
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qualified to perform. They have neither been appointed for that 
purpose nor do they have the mandate of the stockholders or of any 
other corporate stakeholder from whom they are taking away money 
(cf. Friedman, 1993:163-164). Friedman is thus convinced that 
corporations do not have any moral obligations towards society. 
Their only moral obligation is to make profits for their shareholders 
within the confines of the law. 
From the above exposition of the King II view of the present-day 
corporation it is clear that the Report rejects the stakeholder-
dominant theory stand that Friedman takes on corporate social 
responsibility. The Report states explicitly that the stakeholder-
dominant theory is outdated as it “has been rejected by Courts in 
various jurisdictions” (IoD, 2002:9). The Report seems to have taken 
its lead on corporate social responsibility from thinkers like 
Christopher Stone who challenges Friedman’s view on corporate 
social responsibility in his book, The social control of corporate 
behaviour (1975). 
Stone (1992) challenges various aspects of Friedman’s view of the 
present-day corporation and its obligations. Relevant for this 
discussion is especially his critique of Friedman’s view that 
managers have only two moral obligations, viz. to make profits for 
their shareholders and to remain within the boundaries of the law in 
doing so. His critique on these two points will now be examined.  
Stone (1992) rejects the notion that managers have a moral 
obligation to increase profits for the sake of stakeholders. He argues 
that Friedman’s argument is premised on agency theory, which 
asserts that managers are the agents of shareholders, and in that 
capacity, they run corporations on behalf of and for the benefit of 
shareholders. Stone, however, believes that agency theory is deeply 
flawed. He raises two arguments in support of his view. First, no 
principal-agent agreement exists between shareholders and 
managers. Shareholders seldom meet with managers to discuss the 
relationship among them. On the contrary, most shareholders never 
have, nor seek the opportunity to liaise with managers, as they buy 
their shares from other shareholders through brokers. Stone 
(1992:439) says in this regard that “the manager of the corporation, 
unlike the broker, was never even offered a chance to refuse the 
shareholder’s ‘terms’ (if they were that) to maximize the share-
holder’s profits”. 
Secondly Stone argues that the notion of managers being the 
agents of shareholders is both de jure and de facto invalid. The law 
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does not give recognition to the idea that managers are the agents 
of shareholders. Nor do managers in business practice act like 
agents of shareholders. Should managers have been the agents of 
shareholders, one should have expected them to regularly consult 
with their principals (shareholders) in order to determine their 
principals’ expectations. This is not the case in actual business 
practice, and therefore Stone (1992:440) states that the idea of 
managers being the agents of shareholders “is embarrassingly at 
odds with the way in which supposed ‘agents’ actually behave”.  
The King II Report clearly agrees with the position taken by Stone. It 
makes it clear that the moral obligation of directors (and therefore 
also at least of some executive managers) are not towards 
shareholders in the first place, but towards the company. The Report 
states that shareholders have only limited rights, “their only rights 
being a right to vote and a right to dividends” (IoD, 2002:9). 
Christopher Stone also rejects Friedman’s idea that managers 
merely have an obligation to remain within the boundaries of the law 
in pursuing their corporate objectives. He insists that besides 
obeying the law, managers have an additional obligation to act with 
social responsibility. He raises a number of arguments to sub-
stantiate his view. His primary argument in this respect is that a 
mere reliance on the stipulations of the law can lead to gross 
irresponsible behaviour by corporations. The law according to Stone 
is always reactive. Laws are only made after certain damage has 
been done and proved. Only then does the lawgiver lay down laws 
and regulations to prevent further similar damage from occurring. 
Should a corporation only have a responsibility to remain within the 
boundaries of the law, it would be acceptable for them to carry on 
with harmful and irresponsible behaviour until a law has been 
passed that prevent them from doing so. Such an attitude would 
foster and protect irresponsibility by corporations. This is clear when 
Stone (1992:444) says: “There is something grotesque – and 
socially dangerous – in encouraging corporate managers to believe 
that, until the law tells them otherwise, they have no responsibilities 
beyond the law.”  
Also in this respect there seems to be a strong concurrence 
between the position taken by Stone and the one taken by the King 
II Report. The latter exhibits a strong emphasis on corporate 
citizenship that echoes Stone’s sentiments. On a number of 
occasions the “Introduction and Background” section of the King II 
Report explicitly states that the social responsibilities of business 
exceed the legal obligations of the present-day corporation. By 
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introducing and giving prominence to the notion of the corporation 
as corporate citizen the Report implies that corporations have 
responsibilities to society in their capacity as citizens. Corporations 
cannot only be viewed as legal entities that are the bearers of legal 
rights. Corporations are expected to play a much more pro-active 
role in developing and strengthening the societies in which they 
operate. This requirement clearly transpires in the Report’s 
discussion of the seven characteristics of good corporate 
governance, where it lists “social responsibility” as one of these 
characteristics. In explaining what social responsibility entails, the 
Report states that  
a well-managed company will be aware of, and respond to, 
social issues, placing a high priority on ethical standards. A 
good corporate citizen is increasingly seen as one that is non-
discriminatory, non-exploitive, and responsible with regard to 
environmental and human rights issues (IoD, 2002:11). 
Also when the Report deals with the notion of “a license to operate”, 
it is clear that a mere reliance on the law is no longer sufficient. 
There is a distinct move from legality to legitimacy to be detected in 
the Report. It is indicated that in the past a company only needed 
legal approval to start its operations. This requirement, however, is 
no longer sufficient for the contempory corporation. Besides 
receiving legal permission for running a business, the Report states 
that companies also need to enjoy the approval of the communities 
in which they operate and be regarded as legitimate by the 
stakeholders who are affected by the company’s operations. With 
regard to the license to operate the Report states that  
Boards have to consider not only the regulatory aspect, but also 
industry and market standards, industry reputation, the 
investigative media, and the attitude of customers, suppliers, 
consumers, employees, investors, and communities (local, 
national and international), ethical pressure groups, public 
opinion, public confidence, political opinion, etc. (IoD, 2002:6).  
The license to operate is thus conceived as a trust relationship that 
needs to be built between a corporation and its stakeholders, and 
this trust relationship will only develop if the corporation positively 
takes responsibility for the society in which it operates. The Report 
states this explicitly when it quotes a publication by Reputation 
Assurance that states that “demonstrating concern creates an 
atmosphere of trust and a better understanding of corporate aims” 
(IoD, 2002:9). 
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On the issue of corporate social responsibility it can thus be 
concluded that the King II report rejects shareowner-dominant 
theory as well as agency theory, and accepts that present-day 
corporations have social responsibilities towards society that exceed 
their legal obligations to society. 
4. Corporate moral agency 
The traces of another debate, viz. the one on corporate moral 
agency, also seem to have had an influence on the thinking behind 
the King II Report. This debate was also sparked by Friedman’s 
1970 article that has already been discussed. In the mentioned 
article Friedman denies that corporations can be regarded as moral 
agents. According to him a corporation is merely a legal person, with 
artificial legal responsibilities. He thus contends:  
Only people can have responsibilities. A corporation is an 
artificial person, and in this sense may have artificial 
responsibilities, but ‘business’ as a whole cannot be said to 
have responsibilities, even in the vague sense (Friendman, 
1993:162). 
He uses this argument to substantiate his claim that corporations 
cannot be regarded as moral persons and that consequently they 
cannot be burdened with social responsibilities. Only natural 
persons, according to him, can be regarded as moral agents with 
ensuing moral responsibilities. For that reason managers can be 
said to have moral responsibilities in their personal capacities, but a 
corporation as a whole cannot have moral (or social) responsibilities.  
A similar line of argumentation in the debate on corporate moral 
agency was pursued by thinkers like Velasquez, Ladd and Danley, 
who argue that all corporate actions can be reduced to decisions 
taken by individuals in organisations. Moore (1999:335) refers to this 
approach towards corporate moral agency as “methodological 
individualism” while Kaptein and Wempe (2002:118) call it the 
“functional model of corporate responsibility”. What unifies thinkers 
who take this line of reasoning is their conviction that corporations 
cannot be regarded as moral agents. Corporations, they believe, 
cannot act on their own. Only the individuals who are employed by 
the corporation can act on behalf of the corporation. The corporation 
provides the context within which managers or employees act, but 
the ultimate moral responsibility for the actions taken within this 
corporate context resides with the managers and/or employees. 
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Corporate moral agency could and should thus be reduced to 
individual moral responsibility. 
Friedman’s view on the moral agency of corporations was 
challenged by Peter French in a famous article with the title “The 
corporation as a moral person” published in the American 
Philosophical Quarterly of 1979. In this article he first agrees with 
Friedman that corporations are legal persons, but then disagrees 
with Friedman that being legal persons exclude corporations from 
being moral persons (or agents) as well. He then analyses what the 
pre-conditions of moral agency are and comes to the conclusion that 
the following criteria apply: (a) an agent must be linked with a 
specific event, and (b) the event (or action) must be intended by an 
agent. Whenever this relationship between an event and the 
intentions of an actor can be established, the notion of 
“responsibility” can be applied. In other words the actor can then be 
held morally responsible for the event.  
The crucial question now is whether corporations can in any 
meaningful sense be portrayed as having intentions that result in 
events (or actions). It cannot be denied that corporations have an 
impact on society – thus those events are caused by corporations. 
The issue, however, is whether such events can only be ascribed to 
individual persons within the corporation, or whether they could be 
ascribed to the organisation as a whole? Peter French believes that 
corporations do pass the test of moral agency and that the 
responsibility for events could therefore be ascribed to a corporation 
as a whole. 
He bases his argument for the moral agency of corporations on what 
he calls the Corporate Internal Decision (or CID) structure of 
corporations. This CID structure consists of two distinct elements. 
• The first element is the organisational flow chart of the 
corporation that assigns specific roles and responsibilities to 
persons in the organisational hierarchy: who is responsible for 
what and who reports to whom in the organisation.  
• The second element is the corporate decision-making rules or 
policies of the organisation that determine how decisions have to 
be made. These decision-making rules or policies are intimately 
aligned with the corporate mission and purpose and ensure that 
decisions are taken that will advance corporate objectives.  
Consequently, decisions taken according to the corporate hierarchy 
and policies can be construed as expressions of the intentions of the 
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corporation as a whole, and not merely as expressions of the 
intentions of individuals within the organisation. The fact that 
corporate actions can be linked with corporate intentions renders 
corporations responsible for their actions and thus qualifies them as 
moral agents in their own right. 
On the score of moral agency it is clear that the King II Report aligns 
itself with French’s view on corporate moral agency rather than with 
Friedman’s view that corporations cannot be regarded as moral 
agents, or with the methodological individualist position that reduces 
corporate moral responsibility to individual responsibility. This 
alignment is most clearly demonstrated in the Report’s adoption of 
the concept of “corporate citizenship”. As a corporate citizen the 
company as such is portrayed as having specific social 
responsibilities and obligations towards society. The Report also 
makes it clear that it is the company as a whole that has these 
responsibilities and obligations and not merely individual directors or 
managers. Obviously the board of directors carries the responsibility 
of deciding what the company’s social responsibilities will be, but 
they do it on behalf of the company and not merely in their personal 
capacities. This is evident when the Report states that “a well-
managed company will be aware of, and respond to, social issues, 
placing a high priority on ethical standards” (IoD, 2002:11). 
5. Stakeholder theory 
A third debate that also has had an impact on the thinking behind 
the King II Report is the stakeholder-theory debate. Edward 
Freeman and others introduced stakeholder theory as a direct 
challenge to the shareholder-dominant theory propagated amongst 
others by Milton Friedman. The crucial question that has driven the 
development of stakeholder theory is: “For whose benefit and at 
whose expense should the firm be managed?” (Evan & Freeman, 
1993:76). 
In their article, “A stakeholder theory of the modern corporation: 
Kantian capitalism”, Evan and Freeman (1993) argue that both legal 
and moral grounds exist for rejecting shareholder-dominant theory. 
The legal argument is premised on the fact that courts have rejected 
the notion that managers only have obligations towards share-
holders. They state that “the law has evolved to effectively constrain 
the pursuit of stockholder interest at the expense of other claimants 
on the firm” (Evan & Freeman, 1993:76). They also refer to a series 
of law suits in which courts protected the rights of customers, 
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employees, local communities and imposed duties upon 
corporations with regard to these stakeholder groups. 
Evan and Friedman find the moral grounds for rejecting shareholder-
dominant theory in Immanuel Kant’s ethics of respect for persons, 
which states that no person should be treated as a means to an end, 
but all persons should be respected as ends in their own right. 
Based on this principle they argue that corporations and their 
managers may not violate the rights of others in their pursuit of 
corporate objectives. Violating the rights of stakeholders in the 
pursuit of shareholder value is immoral and unacceptable. 
Corporations, they argue, do not only have a moral obligation, but a 
fiduciary duty to respect both the rights of shareholders and all other 
stakeholders. This is clearly reflected in “The Principle of Corporate 
Legitimacy” that they formulated:  
The corporation should be managed for the benefit of its 
stakeholders: its customers, suppliers, employees, and local 
communities. The rights of these groups must be ensured, and, 
further, the groups must participate, in some sense, in decisions 
that substantially affect their welfare (Evan & Freeman 
1993:82). 
Evan and Freeman try to give concrete expression to the 
participation rights of stakeholders by suggesting that the traditional 
board of directors that is solely elected by shareholders should be 
replaced with a board on which the main stakeholder groups of the 
company are represented. 
Crucial to stakeholder theory is the definition of a stakeholder. Evan 
and Freeman opt for what they call a “narrow definition” of 
stakeholders, which “includes those groups who are vital to the 
survival and success of the corporation” (Evan & Freeman, 
1993:79). They deliberately avoid the “wider definition” that includes 
“any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
corporation” for the reason that “it raises to many difficult issues” 
(Evan & Freeman, 1993:79). 
Not only their definition of stakeholders, but also their version of 
stakeholder theory gave rise to serious debate. Kenneth Goodpaster 
raised some serious concerns about their notion of what he called 
“multi-fiduciary stakeholder theory”. He was particularly perturbed by 
the fact that they extended managers’ fiduciary duties to 
shareholders to other stakeholders as well: “Comparing the ethical 
relationship between managers and stockholders with their 
738   Koers 70(4) 2005:727-744 
G. J. (Deon) Rossouw 
relationship to other stakeholders is as problematic as ignoring 
stakeholders (ethically) altogether” (Goodpaster, 1993:205). 
In defending his own version of stakeholder theory, Goodpaster 
introduced the important distinction between strategic and normative 
stakeholder theory. Strategic stakeholder theory holds that 
stakeholders should be taken into consideration by management as 
they potentially can affect the corporation’s performance. Although 
strategic stakeholder theory does emphasise the importance of 
stakeholders, it does so for purely strategic reasons: stakeholders 
are only considered as a “potential impediment to the achievement 
of strategic objectives” (Goodpaster, 1993:209). Consequently there 
is no distinctive ethical obligation towards stakeholders in strategic 
stakeholder theory, because stakeholders are only considered 
important if they possibly could thwart corporate objectives. Should 
stakeholders be detrimentally affected by a corporation, but not pose 
a strategic threat to the corporation, then that stakeholder group 
could be ignored. 
Goodpaster finds strategic stakeholder theory wanting on this 
ground and rather propagates a version of normative stakeholder 
theory that would compel management to (ethically) respect all 
stakeholders of the corporation, regardless of their strategic 
importance to the corporation. On this score, he still agrees with the 
Evan and Freeman’s Kantian respect for all persons. His way, 
however, departs from theirs in his assertion that ethical respect for 
all stakeholders does not imply that management has a similar 
fiduciary duty to stakeholders than they have to shareholders. His 
first concern is that with a multi-fiduciary relationship with all 
stakeholders, the clashing expectations of various stakeholder 
groups might push “decision-making towards paralysis because of 
the dilemmas posed by divided loyalties” (Goodpaster, 1993:215). A 
second, and more serious concern, is that it “represents nothing less 
than the conversion of the modern private corporation into a public 
institution” (Goodpaster, 1993:215). Goodpaster thus wishes to 
protect the private nature of corporations and the benefits that it 
offers in terms of individual liberty and enterprise. 
Instead of a multi-fiduciary relationship with all stakeholders, he 
advocates a position in which the corporation only has a fiduciary 
duty towards shareholders, but still has moral obligations to its other 
stakeholders. These moral obligations do not flow from a fiduciary 
relationship, but from “other relationships at least that deep” 
(Goodpaster, 1993:218). Goodpaster believes that the fact that such 
moral obligations towards stakeholders are non-fiduciary, does not 
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mean that they are less serious than fiduciary duties; they are still 
“categorical or direct” (Goodpaster, 1993:218). By introducing this 
distinction between fiduciary duties and moral duties he wishes to 
safeguard private corporations from lapsing into public institutions. 
Gauging the King II Report on its position with regard to the 
stakeholder-theory debate is much more complex compared to the 
previous two debates that have been discussed above. That the 
King II Report opts for some form of stakeholder theory is clear. It 
explicitly rejects what the Report calls “shareowner dominant 
theory”. Instead it adopts an inclusive approach to corporate 
governance “in the interest of a wide range of stakeholders” (IoD, 
2002:5). 
In defining stakeholders the Report aligns itself very closely with the 
Evan and Freeman definition of stakeholders. Evan and Freeman 
(1993:79) define stakeholders as “those groups who are vital to the 
survival and success of the corporation”. The King II definition of 
stakeholders is almost identical as it defines stakeholders as “those 
whose relations to the enterprise cannot be completely contracted 
for, but upon whose co-operation and creativity it depends for its 
survival and prosperity” (IoD, 2002:103). 
The crucial issue is to assess whether the definition opts for a 
strategic version of stakeholder theory or whether it opts for a 
normative version of stakeholder theory. There are indications in 
both directions in the Report. On the one side the Report makes a 
number of statements that suggest a strategic stakeholder-theory 
position. Already in the Report’s adoption of the narrow definition of 
stakeholders (that Evan and Freeman opted for) there is an 
indication that the Report leans toward a strategic stakeholder-
theory position. The narrow definition emphasises groups that are 
strategically important to the company, while the broader definition 
mentioned above in the discussion of Evan and Freeman, are more 
in line with a normative stakeholder-theory position. Furthermore the 
Report also states that “the modern approach is for a board to 
identify the company’s stakeholders, including its shareowners, and 
to agree policies as to how the relationship with those stakeholders 
should be advanced and managed in the interest of the company” 
(my italics - DR) (IoD, 2002:5). Elsewhere it states that taking care 
of its stakeholders is likely to result in “indirect economic benefits 
such as improved productivity and corporate reputation” (my italics – 
DR) (IoD, 2002:11). These statements suggest that stakeholders 
should be respected, merely because it is beneficial to the 
corporation to do so. 
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On the other side the Report also makes a number of statements 
that lean more towards a normative stakeholder-theory position. It 
for example states that “the relationship between the company and 
its stakeholders should be mutually beneficial” (my italics – DR) 
(IoD, 2002:6), and that the company should “embrace values, ethics 
and the reciprocal relationships with stakeholders other than 
shareowners” (my italics – DR) (IoD, 2002:9). Maybe the clearest 
indication of a leaning towards a normative stakeholder approach is 
when the Report states that companies should place “a high priority 
on ethical standards”, be “non-exploitive”, and “responsible with 
regard to human rights issues” (IoD, 2002:11). 
The apparent tension between a strategic and a normative 
stakeholder approach that is evident from the above sets of 
statements can most probably be explained by reference to the 
deliberate self-regulatory approach the Report adopts and 
recommends. It does not opt for a mandatory or external regulatory 
approach, but wishes to convince companies that it is “in the 
enlightened self-interest of every enterprise to take careful 
cognisance of the recommendations outlined in this Report” (IoD, 
2002:19). This self-regulatory approach requires that companies 
should be motivated or enticed to accept and apply the 
recommendations of the Report voluntarily. It therefore does not 
surprise that the more normative stakeholder leanings of the Report 
is augmented with more strategic considerations in an attempt to 
motivate companies to adopt the Report’s recommendations. It 
would thus be a fair appraisal to say that although the Report adopts 
a normative stakeholder approach, it utilises a strategic stakeholder-
theory logic to convince companies to adopt the Report’s 
recommendations. 
With regard to the issue of multi-fiduciary stakeholder relationships, 
it is clear that the Report follows the direction suggested by 
Goodpaster, rather than the Evan and Freeman direction. There is 
no indication in the Report that there should be tampered with the 
existing relationship between a board and the shareholders of the 
company, nor is there any indication that the private nature of 
corporations should be changed. Also Evan and Freeman’s idea of a 
stakeholder board of directors did not find any support in the Report. 
Although the Report emphasises the importance of stakeholder 
engagement and participation, it steers clear of Evan and Freeman’s 
view of a multi-stakeholder board. 
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6. African world view 
At the end of the “Introduction and Background” section of the King 
II Report reference is made to the “African worldview and culture” 
(IoD, 2002:17). This reference only occurs after all the character-
istics of the contemporary corporation mentioned thus far have been 
discussed and eventually summarised in section 35 of the 
“Introduction and Background” to the Report. The African worldview 
is then attended to in section 38 where the point is made that a 
governance system should reflect “the value system of the society in 
which it operates” (IoD, 2002:17). In the discussion of the African 
worldview, some of its characteristics like an inclination towards 
consensus rather than dissension, humility towards others, non-
discrimination, co-existence, trust and high standards of morality are 
introduced. Although it undeniably is true that these features, that 
are later in the Report called “the Ubuntu philosophy” (IoD, 
2002:99), are closely aligned to the inclusive approach to corporate 
governance, it is doubtful whether they played a significant role in 
the formulation of the King II view of the corporation. Both the late 
introduction of the African worldview in the discussion, and the fact 
that it is not directly integrated into the discussion on the modern 
corporation and its obligations, reinforces the impression that it only 
serves as a contextual background at best, or a superficial attempt 
to Africanise the Report at worse. It thus seems that it did not have 
the same impact on the Report’s understanding of the present-day 
corporation and its moral obligations than the other philosophical 
debates discussed above. 
In conclusion the implications of the above philosophical premises 
regarding the present-day corporation that the Report seems to 
have adopted will be attended to. The recommendations of the King 
II Report are captured in its “Code of Corporate Practices and 
Conduct” (IoD, 2002:20-41). It will be determined whether the 
implications of the philosophical premises adopted in the 
“Introduction and Background” section of the Report found their way 
into the actual recommendations of the Report.  
7. Congruency between premises and recom-
mendations 
When the philosophical premises of the King II Report are compared 
with the actual recommendations of the Report (in the “Code of 
Corporate Practices and Conduct”, hereafter referred to as “the 
Code”), there seems to be both continuities and discontinuities. 
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The continuities are to be found in the fact that the Code clearly 
signals a move beyond a shareholder-dominant view of the 
corporation towards a stakeholder view thereof. This move is, for 
example, clear in the Code’s recommendations on risk management 
that emphasises the importance of “behaving responsibly towards all 
stakeholders” (IoD, 2002: 31). In section 8 of the Code that deals 
with “Communication”, the focus is also on how the board of 
directors should communicate with its stakeholders (IoD, 2002:40). 
In addition, in the recommendations on integrated sustainability 
reporting (IoD, 2002:35-38) the Code urges companies to actively 
engage with its stakeholders in determining the company’s 
standards of ethical behaviour (IoD, 2002:37). Recommendations 
like these clearly signal a move away from shareholder-dominant 
theory to a stakeholder view of the corporation, as well as from an 
exclusive approach to corporate governance to an inclusive 
approach thereto. Although this double move is clearly in the making 
in both the premises and recommendations of the Report, it is also 
clear that the move is difficult and that “old habits die hard”. There 
are also some apparent and significant discontinuities between the 
philosophical premises of the Report and its recommendations. 
These discontinuities manifest throughout the Code. In the entire 
section of the Code that deals with “Boards and Directors” no 
mention is made of stakeholders. Only shareholders – and in one 
instance minority shareholders – are mentioned. This indeed seems 
at odds with the strong emphasis that has been placed on social 
responsibility, stakeholders other than shareholders, and on 
stakeholder engagement in the philosophical premises of the 
Report. In the section of the Code that deals with “Integrated 
Sustainability Reporting” stakeholder engagement is only mentioned 
with regard to determining a company’s ethical standards, but not 
with regard to its internal and external social reporting (cf. Rossouw 
& Van Vuuren, 2004:200). This also seems at odds with the strong 
emphasis on stakeholder participation (IoD, 2002:5) and “mutually 
beneficial” relationships with stakeholders (IoD, 2002:6) that was 
emphasised in the Report’s discussion of an inclusive corporate 
governance approach. Finally, in stipulating the matters on which 
directors should report in their annual report, only financial reporting 
is mentioned, while no mentioning is made of directors’ 
responsibilities with regard to social, ethical and environmental 
reporting. In fairness it should be stated that when the Code is read 
as a whole, responsibilities with regard to social, ethical and 
environmental issues are implied elsewhere, but the fact that they is 
not explicitly mentioned in the Code, just might be an indication that 
Koers 70(4) 2005:727-744  743 
The philosophical premises of the second King Report on corporate governance  
the shift to an inclusive stakeholder approach to corporate 
governance is not as pervasive in the recommendations of the 
Report as it is in its philosophical premises. 
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